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Dreaming: Journal of the Association for the Study of Dreams
March 2005 (Vol. 15, No. 1)
CONTENTS
Refocusing the Neurocognitive Approach to Dreams: A Critique of the Hobson
Versus Solms Debate
G. William Domhoff
Page 3
In
Bed With Mark Solms? What a Nightmare! A Reply to Domhoff (2005)
J. Allan Hobson
Page 21
A Reply to Hobson (2005)
G. William Domhoff
Page 30
Dream Imagery and Emotion
John Davidson, Sarah Lee-Archer, and Gretchen Sanders
Page 33
Theory of Mind in Dreaming: Awareness of Feelings and Thoughts of Others in
Dreams.
David Kahn and Allan Hobson
Page 48
BOOK REVIEWS:
Cognitive Therapy and Dreams.
edited by R. I. Rosner, W. L. J. Lyddon, and A. Freeman.
Reviewed by Nicholas E. Brink
Page 58
The Mind at Night: The New Science of How and Why We Dream.
by Andrea Rock.
Reviewed by Michael Schredl
Page 63
ABSTRACTS
Refocusing the Neurocognitive Approach to Dreams: A Critique of the Hobson
Versus Solms Debate
G. William Domhoff
Dreaming: Journal of the Association for the Study of Dreams. Vol
15(1) 3-20, March 2005.
This article examines the ongoing debate between activation-synthesis
theorist J. Allan Hobson and psychoanalytic theorist Mark Solms about the nature
of dreaming and dream content. After discussing their neurophysiological
disagreements, it argues that they are more similar than different in some
important ways, especially in talking about dreams in the same breath as
psychosis and in drawing conclusions about dream content on the basis of their
neurophysiological assumptions, without any reference to the systematic findings
on the issue. Evidence from inside and outside the sleep laboratory on the
coherent nature of most dreams is presented to demonstrate that neither theorist
is on solid ground in his main assertions. Dreaming is usually a far more
realistic and understandable enactment of interests and concerns than the 2
researchers assume. In addition, several of Hobson's and Solms's claims
concerning the neural basis of dreaming are challenged on the basis of
neurophysiological evidence.
KEY WORDS: dreams, dream content, neurocognitive activation-synthesis, Freud
In Bed With Mark Solms? What a Nightmare! A Reply to Domhoff (2005)
J. Allan Hobson
Dreaming: Journal of the Association for the Study of Dreams. Vol 15(1)
21-29, March 2005.
Bill Domhoff (2005) has challenged the activation synthesis model of dreaming on
the basis of a misreading of the neurobiological literature and an
individualistic view of dream psychology. The author begins his reply by
clarifying and emphasizing the formal approach to dream cognitions. Instead of
focusing on the individual aspects of dreaming that interest Domhoff, activation
synthesis strives to identify and measure the generic differences that
characterize all dreams and that are likely to correlate with the
neurobiological findings. He then goes on to point out that such formal features
as the visuomotor imagery, the emotional intensification, and the defective
cognition of dreams do correlate with the cellular and molecular neurobiological
data from animal studies and with the brain imaging and lesion data from human
studies. Individual differences may also exist but these are not relevant to the
main task of sleep psychophysiology.
KEY WORDS: dream theory, Domhoff, Solms, activation synthesis
A Reply to Hobson (2005)
G. William Domhoff
Dreaming: Journal of the Association for the Study of Dreams. Vol 15(1)
30-32, March 2005.
J. A. Hobson's (2005) commentary merely repeats his past theoretical
assertions. It asks questions that rest on the refuted hypothesis that real
dreaming occurs only in REM sleep and that are already answered in the author's
critique. Despite many studies, there is still no evidence that
neurophysiological changes during REM are responsible for any unique formal
features in dreams. As for the psychological consequences of the neuromodulatory
environment during REM, there are no studies. Most important, Hobson overlooks a
key point in regard to a new neurocognitive approach to dreams: The many
parallels between dreaming and waking cognition raise the intriguing possibility
that relatively small changes from waking to sleeping can account for the unique
features of dreams, rendering his REM-based speculations irrelevant.
KEY WORDS: dreaming, dream content, neurocognitive, REM sleep
Dream Imagery and Emotion
John Davidson, Sarah Lee-Archer, and Gretchen Sanders
Dreaming: Journal of the Association for the Study of Dreams. Vol
15(1) 33-47, March 2005.
The relationship between prominent visual imagery and emotion within
dreams was investigated in relation to E. Hartmann's (1996) contextualizing
image (CI) theory and M. Seligman and A. Yellen's (1987) dual imagery theory.
Fifty-nine students recorded dreams over a 2-week period and submitted 115
dreams for analysis. Participants recorded ratings of emotion type and emotion
intensity in each scene. Prominent visual images were identified and scored for
intensity and detail by independent judges. As hypothesized from Hartmann's
theory, there was a significant positive relationship between CI intensity and
emotion intensity in the CI scene, emotion intensity generally peaked in the CI
scene, and dreams containing a CI had higher overall ratings of emotion
intensity than non-CI dreams. The result for the correlation of detail of
prominent imagery with emotion was inconclusive, with a low positive correlation
across CI scenes. This raises the possibility that the CI is not a unitary
construct.
KEY WORDS: dreams, dreaming, emotion, imagery, contextualizing imagery
Theory of Mind in Dreaming: Awareness of Feelings and Thoughts of Others in
Dreams.
David Kahn and Allan Hobson Dreaming: Journal of the Association
for the Study of Dreams.
Vol 15(1) 48-57, March 2005.
If the awareness of what others are thinking and the ability to attribute
feelings to others characterizes both waking and dreaming consciousness, it
suggests that a social species like man has a state-independent need for a
theory of mind; that is, an ability to know that others have feelings. The
authors performed 2 studies, the first of which consisted of 35 participants who
submitted 320 dream reports containing more than 1,200 dream characters and the
second consisted of 24 participants who submitted 151 dream reports with 543
dream events. Participants reported that as subjects in their own dreams they
were aware that their dream characters had feelings and thoughts about them.
This finding shows that awareness of what others are feeling is a robust aspect
of consciousness that is maintained despite the changed chemistry and changed
activation patterns of the brain's neuronal connections during dreaming.
KEY WORDS: dreaming, consciousness, theory of mind, social species, intentions of others
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